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Reich: Corporate Accountability and Regulatory Reform

CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
REGULATORY REFORM
Robert B. Reich*
The corporate form of business organization has served as an
efficient device for transforming the contributions of investors, creditors, workers, managers, and suppliers into products of greater
value to consumers and then distributing that increase in wealth
back to each contributor. This seemingly tidy arrangement belies a
number of difficult questions. How should the costs and benefits of
corporate activity be allocated among the contributors given the
risks and costs that each bears? How should they be allocated to
others affected by corporate activity, such as neighboring citizens
who suffer from a contaminated environment or consumers who
must choose between products of varying quality and price?
The costs and benefits of corporate activity often fall unevenly.
It is commonly assumed, for example, that all parties benefit when
innovative managers produce better products at lower cost. If the
innovation creates pollution or toxic wastes, however, benefits
come at the expense of neighboring citizens. If the innovation
threatens the health or safety of employees, all other parties benefit at the employees' expense. If it causes consumers to pay for repeated repair work or to contract cancer ten years after using the
product, then consumers sacrifice their well-being for the benefit
of other parties. If managers deceive shareholders into thinking
that the corporation is more profitable than it is, shareholders subsidize everyone else. There are no generally accepted economic,
political, or ethical criteria for deciding which of these interests
should be preferred. Each "invests" in the enterprise by contributing venture capital, credit, labor, managerial talent, new ideas,
or supplies, by living with noise or pollution, or by purchasing a final product. Therefore, each bears some risk for the sake of possible gain and no interest is inherently more deserving of a higher
net rate of "return" on its investment in the enterprise than any
other.
* Director of Policy Planning, Federal Trade Commission. B.A., 1968, Dartmouth
College; M.A., 1970, Oxford University; J.D., 1973, Yale University. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the FTC.
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How, then, are the costs and benefits of corporate enterprise
to be allocated? In practice, the allocation has usually been determined by market exchanges through which these parties bargain
with one another. Greater financial risks may require higher possible returns to motivate potential shareholders and bondholders to
contribute capital; greater workplace risks may require hazardousduty pay to attract workers; greater product risks may require
money-back guarantees or discount prices to attract consumers;
higher levels of noise or pollution may require lower real estate
prices to attract home buyers. Such market exchanges are shaped
by laws that define private property1 and establish rules for con2
tracting between parties.
Increasingly, however, the allocation of corporate costs and
benefits has been determined collectively through laws and regulations that set precise limits on industrial contamination, 3 impose
specific safety requirements on the workplace, 4 establish minimum
standards of product quality5 and safety, 6 and impose a particular
structure of corporate governance. 7 Those who favor collective
1. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1090-92, 1106-10 (1972);
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (Papers and Proceedings).
2. See Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 814-15 (1941);
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1978); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 88-89 (1977). See generally
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 69-98 (2d ed. 1977) (analysis of various

contract principles utilizing efficiency criteria).
3. E.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 405.10-.126 (1979) (establishing effluent standards for
dairy product processors); id. §§ 420.10-.262 (establishing effluent standards for iron
and steel manufacturers); 7 N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 14:2.1-:7.6 (Supp. 1979) (establishing water pollution standards); id. §§ 27:2.1-:3.7 (establishing air quality
standards).
4. E.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1915.1-1917.84 (1979) (establishing workplace safety requirements for shipbuilding, repairing, and breaking); 12 N.Y. CODES, RULES &
REcS. §§ 10-1.1 to -4.8 (1963) (establishing workplace safety and health requirements
for foundries); id. §§ 12.1-.29 (1971) (establishing standards for air quality in factories).
5. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2002 (1976 & Supp. I 1977) (establishing minimum miles per
gallon for passenger cars on graduated scale from 1978-1985); 17 CAL. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 15930-15970 (1978) (establishing levels of product quality and labelling rules for
food extracts).
6. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1303 (1979) (banning lead-containing paint and certain consumer products bearing lead-containing paint); id. §§ 1615-1616 (establishing
flammability standards for children's sleepwear); 6 N.Y. CODES, RULES & REGS.

§

221.2 (1972) (banning surface-coat spray materials containing asbestos).
7. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 601-604 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979) (mandating
shareholders' meetings and requiring shareholder consent to certain transactions);
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decisionmaking contend, among other things, that market exchanges
do not adequately protect people from entering into uninformed
agreements that are against their better interest, 8 that in market
exchanges costs often fall upon innocent third parties who did

not even tacitly agree to bear them, 9 and that managers of large
corporations possess discretionary power virtually unconstrained by

the market.10 It is also argued that the resulting allocation of corporate costs and benefits within market exchanges is often unfair,

even if efficient, 1 ' and
that no party should be financially induced
12
to bear certain risks.
In contrast, those who advocate employing market exchanges

instead of collective decisionmaking to allocate corporate costs and
benefits, point out that legislatures normally are incapable of both

developing the requisite expertise and negotiating the compromises
necessary to enact detailed standards of corporate behavior.' 3
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141-145 (1975 & Supp. 1978) (requiring that business of
every corporation be run by board of directors and establishing certain procedures
for their governance); id. §§ 211-230 (requiring annual meeting of shareholders and
establishing rules and procedures for its conduct); 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01 to -05 (1979)
(requiring that independent accountants certify accuracy of financial records).
8. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 132-40 (1976).
9. See M. Green & N. Waitzman, Business War on the Law: An Analysis of the
Benefits of Federal Health/Safety Enforcement 7, 13-14 (1979) (report of the Corporate Accountability Research Group) (copy on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review).
10. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 75-80; see M.
FAINSOD, L. GORDON & J. PALAMOUNTAIN, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY 7-11 (3d ed. 1959); Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of
Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 37 (E. Mason ed. 1959). See
generally C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977).
11. N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 359-65 (1976); see J. PAGE & M.
O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES 47-68 (1973). Minimum wage laws are considered inefficient, and are justified on notions of equity. Cf. Adie, Teen-Age Unemployment and
Real Federal Minimum Wages, 81 J. POLITICAL ECON. 435, 437-39 (1973) (increase
in federal minimum wage causes unemployment among teenagers); Stigler, The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation, 36 Am. ECON. REV. 358, 361-62 (1946) (minimum wage provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 have reduced aggregate
employment).
12. For example, the less wealthy are often financially compelled to undertake
especially hazardous jobs. N. ASHFORD, supra note 11, at 18-20, 363-65. For a
discussion of inalienable "entitlements," see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at
1111-15.
13. See generally C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST
(1977). Increasingly commentators and congressional committees are reexamining the
validity of regulation and requiring fresh justifications for favoring regulation over
market exchanges. See, e.g., VI SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION (Comm. Print 1978); Breyer,
Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Re-
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Alternatively, administrative agencies, dependent on regulated industries for data and for future employment of agency personnel,
are often incapable of maintaining an arm's-length relationship with

the industries. 14 Procedures designed to overcome this coziness by
providing the public with the right to intervene in regulatory proceedings, 1 5 gain access to agency records, 16 observe agency deliberations, 17 and challenge agency conclusions on appeal, have resulted in agonizing delay and red tape. Many of these procedures

are regularly employed by competitors seeking either a strategic
advantage over rivals or a means of postponing administrative action. 19 In addition, the regulations that emerge from this process

are notoriously inefficient and uncoordinated, often undermining
20

productivity and distorting markets.
Proposals for rendering the corporation more accountable to
one or more affected parties, and for reforming the regulatory

process to make it more politically accountable and efficient come
as twin responses to these problems. Such proposals typically seek
either to improve the functioning of market exchanges or to improve the processes of collective decisionmaking. For example, attempts to require corporations to disclose business or professional
form, 92 HAnv. L. REV. 547 (1979). The current emphasis on market simulation as a
standard for regulatory performance has been analyzed as reflecting an absence of
consensus on any other objective criteria for making decisions between competing
interests. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1702-03 (1975).
14. For discussion of "agency capture" by regulated industry, see G. KOLKO,
RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1887-1916 (1965); S. REP. No. 1100, 92d Cong., 2d
Sesg. 8-14 (1972); Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process,
27 STAN. L. REV. 1041, 1055-56 (1975); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MGT. Sci. 335, 337-56 (1974); Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. ScI. 3, 3-10 (1971); cf. C. LINDBLOM, supra
note 10, at 171-88 (government's symbiotic relationship with business).
15. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 11425 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979). See Office of Communication of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
16. E.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976); IOwA CODE
ANN. § 68A.2 (West 1973).
17. E.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 286.011 (West 1975 & Supp. 1979).
18. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976); MICH.
COMp. LAwS ANN. § 2.4-301 (Supp. 1979).
19. See B. OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAN, THE REGULATION GAME 1-42 (1978). Cf.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 557-58 (1978) (expressing impatience with attempts by antinuclearpower groups to exploit various procedural mechanisms in order to delay implementation of agency decision with which they disagree).
20. See C. SCHULTZE, supra note 13, at 46-57; Breyer, supra note 13, at 560-78.
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relations between board members and the existence of standing audit and compensation committees, 21 to have independent accountants certify the accuracy of the company's financial records, 22 to

have corporations disclose workplace 23 and product risks, 24 to
strengthen antitrust laws, 25 and to require corporations to either
compensate third parties directly or purchase marketable permits if
they pollute the environment 26 all seek to improve the efficiency of
market exchanges. They rely upon the decentralized price system
and free trades between parties to determine an optimal level of
cost and benefit for each party affected by corporate enterprise.
In contrast, attempts to require that a majority of board members be outsiders,2 7 that shareholders be permitted to vote cumula21. E.g., Weiss & Schwartz, Disclosure Approach for Directors, HARV. Bus.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1978, at 18, 19-20, 28.
22. E.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01 to -05 (1979).
23. E.g., Occupational Safety & Health Act § 6(b)(6)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(A)
(1976) (requiring employers to give notice to employees of employer's inability to
comply with OSHA standards and employer's request to OSHA for variance); id. §
6(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (requiring labels or other appropriate warnings to ensure that employees are informed of all hazards to which they are exposed); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 6408 (West Supp. 1979) (requiring employers to post information regarding safety protections and obligations of employees, provide opportunity for employees or employee representatives to observe monitoring of employee exposure to
hazards, allow access by employees or their representatives to accurate records of
employee exposures to potentially toxic materials, and notification of employees who
have been exposed to toxic materials or harmful physical agents).
24. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 740.11(a)(1) (1979) (requiring labels on cosmetics packaged
in self-pressurized container to bear warning against spraying in eyes, puncturing,
incinerating, storing at temperature above 1200 F, or leaving within reach of children); 6 N.Y. CODES, RULES & REGs. § 249.4 (1977) (requiring labels on aerosol
spray cans containing chlorofluorocarbons). See also R. NADER, M. GREEN & J.
SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 145-48.
25. E.g., I NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 141-316 (1979);

see Noll, Antitrust Exemptions: An Economic Overview, in II REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 167, 167-80 (Natl Comm'n for the Review
of Antitrust Laws and Procedures ed. 1979). But see note 56 infra and accompanying
text.
26. E.g., B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON,
THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 260-81 (1974); J. DALES,

POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES 93-98 (1968); A. PALMER, W. MOOz, T. QUINN &

K.

WOLF, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATING CHLOROFLUROCARBON EMIs(Rand No. R-2524-EPA) (forthcoming

SIONS FROM NONPROPELLENT APPLICATIONS

1980) (prepared by Rand Corp. for Environmental Protection Agency); Breyer, supra
note 13, at 597; Magat, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation,
LAW & CONTEM'P. PROB., Winter-Spring 1979, at 4, 17.
27. E.g., Hearings on CorporateRights and Responsibilities Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 241, 246 (1976) (statement of Harvey
Goldschmid, Prof. of Law, Columbia Univ.); id. at 338, 339 (statement of Detlev
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tively for board members, 28 that proxy machinery be made available to shareholders, 29 that nonshareholding parties affected by
corporate activity, such as workers, consumers, suppliers, and
neighboring residents, also be represented on the board or be allowed to participate in the selection of board members, 30 and that
representatives of various interests be funded to participate in
regulatory agency proceedings31 all seek to improve the efficiency
of collective decisionmaking. They rely primarily upon negotiation
and agreement-typically by a majority of participants-to determine how corporate costs and benefits should be allocated.
The corporate governance debate is primarily about how to allocate the costs and benefits of corporate activity among those affected by it. Proposals to reform the corporation run the gamut
Vagts, Prof. of Law, Harvard Univ.). Several recent consent decrees have been obtained by the SEC that mandate a minimum number of board members independent
of management. E.g., SEC v. Aydin Corp., 521 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-19
(D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1979), modified, 527 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-25 (D.D.C. Oct.
25, 1979); SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., [1978J FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,485 (E.D. Wis.). Cf. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL Ch. A2,

Part V, at A-29 (Jan. 25, 1978) (requiring company whose securities are listed on exchange to appoint audit committee composed of outside directors with no managerial
responsibilities).
28. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.28 (Smith-Hurd 1970 & Supp. 1979);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.26(3) (West 1969). Federal law only requires that the existence of such rights be disclosed. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (Item 5(c)) (1979). The
SEC is currently considering a rule that would mandate individual voting on each
director nominee. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16104, 44 Fed. Reg.
48,938 (1979) (to be codified, if adopted, in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2)).
29. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c)
(1976); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-7 to -8 (1979).
30. E.g., P. BLUMBERG, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1973); P. BLUMBERG, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 88-90 (1972); D. VOGEL, LOB-

BYING THE CORPORATION 75-78, 218-20 (1978); Davies, Employee Representation on
Company Boards and Participationin Corporate Planning, 38 MOD. L. REV. 254,
257-65 (1975); Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 421, 534-35 app. (1971) (setting forth shareholder resolution demanding that groups affected by corporate activity be represented on board
of directors). See generally Chayes, supra note 10, at 38-41.
31. E.g., COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE 271-77, 342, 347-48 (1976); Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative
Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 388-403 (1972); President's Message to Congress Rec-

ommending Measures to Increase Consumer Participation in Government, 13
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 495 (Apr. 6, 1977); Note, FederalAgency Assistance
to Impecunious Intervenors, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1815 (1975). The FTC is currently

empowered to finance participation of such groups in its rulemaking proceedings. 15
U.S.C. § 57a(h) (1976). For a discussion of the need to broaden the number of interests having input into administrative agency decisionmaking, see Bonfield, Public

Participationin Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants,
Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 540-46 (1970); Stewart, supra note
13, at 1711-1813.
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from market-perfecting strategies to methods of improving collective decisionmaking to demands for corporate altruism. What has
been missing is a systematic analysis of these various proposals
within a framework that allows them to be compared and evaluated. This Article seeks to provide such a framework. It offers a
means of viewing the twin debates over regulatory reform and corporate accountability through the lens of economic and political
analysis. From this perspective, the choice between market-perfecting strategies and proposals to improve collective decisionmaking
turns largely on each alternative's relative efficiency in accommodating affected interests and approximating, however imperfectly,
an allocation of corporate costs and benefits to which all affected
parties would agree. While equity considerations figure prominently in political decisions about the corporation, this Article also
suggests that corporate altruism, standing alone, may not be justifiable. The framework suggested here serves as only one of many
possible starting points for discussing corporate accountability and
regulatory reform. If I convince the reader of nothing more than
that the host of proposals for reforming corporate governance and
regulatory agencies can and should be viewed together as an integrated system of accountability, this Article will have succeeded.
MARKET-PERFECTING STRATEGIES

If all parties potentially affected by a proposed corporate activity could bargain with one another free from the cumbersome costs
of transacting such bargains, 3 2 and if all who stood to gain fully
compensated those who stood to lose, the activity would, by definition, improve total welfare. 33 Unanimous agreement to such a
bargain would signal an improved allocation of corporate risks and
benefits, 3 4 to the extent that no one can be made better off without

32. For a discussion of a hypothetical world without transaction costs, see
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
33. Modem welfare economics is premised on the philosophic notion that overall welfare will be improved by any change pursuant to which those who gain can
fully compensate those who lose and still come out ahead; actual compensation need
not be undertaken. See Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J.
696 (1939); Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and InterpersonalComparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). Unanimous agreement to a proposed change,
therefore, is not a prerequisite to an improvement in overall welfare, but it at least
provides an indication that an improvement has occurred since all potential losers
from the change have acquiesced in it.
34. Alternative optimal conditions are possible. Optimality only describes a situation where it is impossible to improve any one party's condition without making
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making someone else worse off to the same extent.3, Market exchanges would replicate such theoretical bargains if each party had
(a) perfect information about whether its interests were being met
by other parties; (b) alternative parties with whom it could deal as
easily; and (c) costless means of organizing the market to avoid
"free-riders," who obtain the benefit of the bargain without sacrificing anything of their own; "hold-outs," who can reap special advantages because their acquiescense to the bargain is necessary;
and negative "externalities," unaccounted for side-effects on third
parties.
In the real world of imperfect information, market power,
free-riders, hold-outs, and externalities, however, the costs of transacting such theoretically perfect bargains is often prohibitive. 36 It is
often difficult, if not impossible, to locate, inform, gain the assent
of, coordinate, compensate, and police all parties potentially affected by an activity when many disparate individuals are involved.
To the extent that these interests overlap, bargaining may occur
automatically and informally. The self-sufficient island dweller can
be expected to weigh the costs of a proposed activity against its
benefits, and develop a strategy that maximizes benefits and minimizes costs. But the larger the number of individuals involved, the
more costly such bargaining is likely to be. The question, therefore, is which institutional arrangements can best reduce these
costs.
Inadequate Information
Information is costly to produce and to use. Even when all
parties have an incentive to provide one another with truthful information, they will only convey such information when its utility
for reaching more informed agreements does not exceed the costs
another party worse off. P. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 214

(1947). It does not provide a criteria for comparing possible alternative situations in
which that condition can exist. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 10-11; Kennedy,

Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1763
(1976). The adoption of a particular legal structure determines which of many possi-

ble optimal solutions is approximated. See Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law,
19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 255 (1967) (n.s.).

35.

Knut Wicksell was the first to link the potential for all to benefit from a cer-

tain proposal to the unanimity rule. Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation, reprinted in CLAssics IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 72 (R. Musgrave & A. Pea-

cock eds. 1958).
36. See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules
-A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1968).
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of its production and use. Occasionally a party has no incentive to
provide even this optimal amount of truthful information.3 7 Thus it
may be difficult for parties to evaluate the performance of others
with whom they deal, particularly when the market is large and
complex. For example, annual reports to shareholders may mislead
them about firm performance through the use of accounting techniques that are extraordinarily difficult for most shareholders to
evaluate. 3 8 Similarly, residents of areas in which toxic wastes are
dumped may not learn of the dumping-or its effects-until many
years later; 39 workers may not be told of the hazardous nature of
40
the chemicals or dust particles they breathe at the workplace;
and consumers who suffer injuries as a consequence of product failure may have difficulty attributing the cause of the failure to the
41
manufacturer.
A market-perfecting response to such ignorance would require
the corporation to disclose this information. Labeling and advertising regulations of the Food and Drug Administration and Federal
Trade Commission, for example, require that certain manufacturers
disclose the contents 42 and dangers4 3 of their products. The Securi37. Professor Engel argues that notwithstanding lack of guidance from market
exchanges or collective decisionmaking, management has a social duty to alert the
government to corporation-engendered risks about which citizens generally are unaware, so that collective decisionmaking within legislatures and regulatory agencies
can be more efficient. Engle, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32
STAN. L. REV. 1, 70-84 (1979).
38. See Solomon & Smith, Corporate Control and Managerial Misrepresentation of Firm Performance, 10 BELL J. ECON. 319 (1979). For discussion of the problems of permitting conglomerates to file aggregate financial reports that do not report
performance of each division, see Holton, Business and Government, in THE AMERicAN BUSINESS CORPORATION 57, 65 (E. Goldston, H. Morton & G. Ryland eds.
1969); Williamson, On the Governance of the Modern Corporation,8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 63, 75-76 (1979).
39. Residents of the Love Canal of Niagara Falls, New York, discovered twenty
years after industrial wastes were dumped in their midst that the wastes imperiled
their health. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON HAZARDOUS WASTES, N.Y. DEP'T OF
ENVT'L CONSERVATION, HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT 27-28 (1979).

40. See generally J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 1-46.
41. See Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
27-28 (1979). Moreover, the incidence of failure may be so small or geographically
dispersed that most consumers remain unaware of the problem.
42. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 701.3 (1979) (requiring cosmetics to list their ingredients).
Cf. In re Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972) (consent order that
Ocean Spray would stop advertising their product as "juice" more nutritious than
orange juice, and that it would devote tventy-ave percent of one year's advertising
budget to clarifying prior advertisements that may have been misleading).
43. See sources note 24 supra.
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ties and Exchange Commission likewise seeks to ensure that investors receive accurate 44 and timely information about firms. 45
Recent proposals by the Commission to require corporations to disclose facts about board members and board committees40 are also
intended to reduce investors' unforeseen risks. Similarly, corporate
disclosure of workplace hazards 47 permits workers to bargain with
management about these dangers.
Such disclosures have their own costs. Data must be collected
and tabulated. 48 Product disclosures require extra space in advertising and on labels. 49 Beyond these costs, there is the time and attention of those who would use and rely on the data and who must
both assess its relative importance and assimilate the information.
If the information is technically complex and difficult to evaluate,
its availability may do little to improve the efficiency of market ex50
changes.
Lack of Alternative Choices
Effective bargaining requires that both parties have the option
of withdrawing from the negotiations and seeking alternative bargains elsewhere. Frequently, however, there are no alternative
44. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
45. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 7, Schedules A-B, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77aa
(1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976); 17 C.F.R. §§
230.406-.434c, 240.14a-3, .15d-1 to -17 (1979). Cf. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (corporation has duty to disclose in proxy statements its plans to discontinue portion of business after merger), modified on other

grounds, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
46. See 525 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-2 (Oct. 24, 1979) (summary of speech
by Harold Williams, Chairman of Securities and Exchange Commission, 10th Annual
Conference, Nat'l Investors Rel. Inst., Oct. 19, 1979).
47. See statutes note 23 supra.
48. For a criticism on cost-benefit grounds of efforts to increase the amount of
corporate disclosure, see R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CoRPoRATIoN 54-56
(1978).

49. Courts have generally held these costs to be minimal, especially when
weighed against the gravity of the injury that the failure to warn can cause. See, e.g.,
West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Iowa 1972) (evidence
showed that curved tag with warning could have been bonded to each iron sling
without great burden to manufacturer); Moran v. Faberg6, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543-44,
332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975) (since cost of placing warning on label usually minimal, balance almost always weighs in favor of duty to warn). There are, however, a number
of indirect social costs in warnings. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use
and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of
Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 514-17 (1976).

50. Breyer, supra note 13, at 556; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 49, at 514-15.
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parties with whom to deal. For example, public-utility customers
and consumers of products manufactured within highly concentrated industries may find that they have no real choice but to continue dealing with the firm. 51 Similarly, in geographic areas dominated by one or a few large corporations, workers may have no
realistic employment alternative because it may be too costly for
them to learn new skills or move to new regions. 52 Firms that already have invested heavily in special plant and equipment within
a certain locale may find that relocation is too expensive to be a re-

alistic alternative.

53

The market-perfecting strategy for maintaining enough diversity in the market to ensure realistic choice is largely dependent
upon the antitrust laws. Such diversity may be economically costly
54
to attain, however, if it comes at the expense of scale efficiencies.
Yet, if we rely on market exchanges as the primary means of improving overall welfare and increasing individual wealth, 5 5 some
sacrifice in scale efficiencies for the sake of diversity may be appropriate. 5 6 Otherwise, the benefits of scale efficiency are apt to be

enjoyed by managers and shareholders at the expense of other parties, such as workers and consumers, who would be unable to bargain effectively for a portion of the benefits since they would have
few, if any, alternative parties to whom they could threaten to take
their future dealings. Not only might the resulting distribution of
51. A telling illustration of the consumers' bind is offered by Albert Hirschman,
who posits hvo consumer complaints to Ford and General Motors respectively, with
each consumer threatening to purchase from the other manufacturer in the future. A.
HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 27 n.7 (1970).
52. See generally H.R. REP. No. 690, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1979), reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4991, 4993-94.
53. The possibility that one party to a contract might take advantage of the fact
that the other party had already invested heavily in assets unique to performance of
the contract by appropriating this "quasi-rent," may require that the contract be long
term and cover many such transactions. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 297, 302-07 (1978). Such contracts may be so "long term" that they effectively
integrate the contracting parties into a single firm. See Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 238-54
(1979).
54. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 79-80, 192-95 (1978).
55. For a discussion of wealth maximization as the normative basis of economic
efficiency, see Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103 (1979).
56. A number of antitrust decisions have been based on maintaining market diversity, irrespective of whether this comes at the expense of scale efficiencies. See,
e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
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efficiency benefits and monopoly costs be inequitable, 57 but it
might be difficult to estimate whether the benefits in fact exceeded
the costs.
Hold-outs, Free-riders,and Negative Externalities
It may be difficult and costly to organize a market exchange.
"Hold-outs" present one problem. If the right to pollute a geographic area is contingent upon the purchase of pollution rights
from all the homeowners in that region, for example, homeowners who know that their acquiescence is needed might find it
profitable to hold out for better terms than they might otherwise
deem acceptable. "Free-riders" present a second problem. If the
homeowners could purchase clean air by buying out the polluting
factories, it would be difficult to exclude noncontributing homeowners from the benefit of the bargain. "Negative externalities"
present a third problem. Were such bargaining among affected parties to occur, it might be difficult to identify and compensate all
those who might bear the cost of the clean air, such as workers laid
off because their polluting factory must close or reduce produc58
tion.

Eliminating hold-outs, free-riders, and negative externalities
often presents a problem exactly converse to that of maintaining diversity, since one cost of organizing various parties into more effective bargaining units may be a reduction in the amount of market diversity and choice. For example, to the extent that workers
are permitted to organize themselves either to exclude nonparticipating beneficiaries 5 9 or to require participation and thereby prevent hold-outs, 60 there are no alternative (nonorganized) workers
with whom other parties can effectively deal. Thus a critical issue
in evaluating governmental actions that facilitate organization, such
57. See Comanor & Smiley, Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth, 89 Q.J.
ECON. 177 (1975).

58. See generally Demsetz, supra note 1, at 348-49; Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 229-31 (1972).
59. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976) (allowing union shop). But see id. § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (states may pass right-towork laws); ALA. CODE § 25-7-31 (1975) (prohibiting agreement or combination to
deny right to work because of membership or nonmembership in labbr union); GA.
CODE ANN. § 54-804 (1974) ("[c]ompelling persons to join, or refrain from joining, labor organization, or to strike or refrain from striking" shall be unlawful).
60. See National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) ("[r]epresentatives designated or selected for .

.

. collective bargaining by the majority ...

shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees").
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as labor laws, is whether market exchanges are helped by such actions more than they are hampered.
Liability rules that enable certain parties to receive compensation from others for injuries to legally protected interests provide
an alternative form of organization. Such rules can overcome holdouts, free-riders, and externalities without resort to bargaining
units. Since liability rules provide an objective determination of
value, it is no longer necessary to secure acquiesence at a subjectively determined price. Accordingly, hold-outs are avoided. Freeriders can be minimized through class action or derivative suit provisions that aggregate the individual liability claims of all potential
beneficiaries and pay attorney's fees from the aggregate award. And
negative externalities can be remedied to the extent that the threat
of liability induces corporate managers to account for third-party
61
costs in their decisionmaking.
Liability rules have problems of their own, however, that may
discourage efficient bargains. First, the appropriate level of compensation is determined by judges, juries, compensation boards,
and other third parties, whose decisions may not match what the
claimants would have bargained for had they been able to bargain
directly in the market. 62 The resulting allocation of costs and benefits therefore may be suboptimal because a greater or lesser
amount of compensation might have satisfied the claimaint's true
preferences. Second, the process of determining liability and the
appropriate compensation may be inefficient and costly to the participants since it usually relies on centralized, formal, and timeconsuming judicial proceedings. Finally, it may be difficult for potential plaintiffs to discover that they have sustained an injury, particularly if it occurs gradually over many years, or, even if they
discover it, to properly attribute it to a certain corporation. 63
61.

See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1; Demsetz, When Does

the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 25-28 (1972).
62. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1108-10.
63. Courts have begun to grapple with the inequity caused in those situations
where the plaintiff has clearly been injured by someone's negligence, but is unable
to identify the particular tortfeasor. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 371-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (six major domestic manufacturers of
dynamite caps held liable for plaintiffs' injuries due to explosions, although name of
manufacturer destroyed when dynamite caps exploded) (plaintiffs alleged that defendants knew blasting caps were dangerous and that they had agreed among themselves not to place warnings on them); Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1
(jury must find at least one defendant liable when all possible defendants are joined
and someone's negligence caused surgical instrument to break and remain lodged in
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Whatever their costs, liability rules have increasingly shaped
relationships between shareholders, managers, workers, consumers, and neighbors. Suits for products liability, environmental damage, and workplace hazards have imposed substantial liability on
corporations. Although the corporate form limits the extent to
which shareholders are liable to other parties, corporate liability indirectly affects shareholders by eroding corporate good will and
depleting earnings. This retards future sales and lowers share
prices. To mitigate the depletion of earnings, corporations frequently insure themselves against product, workplace, environmental, or personal liability. The size of the insurance premium
ideally reflects the riskiness of the enterprise to the potential plaintiff (consumer, neighbor, or worker). 64 The underlying assumption
is that, to the extent that the liability system is working efficiently,
corporate managers will choose either to pay the higher premium or to reduce the riskiness of their enterprise, whichever is
65
cheaper.
Marketable permits have been suggested as another means of
overcoming hold-outs, free-riders, and externalities. 66 In principle,
the government can create a permit to pollute or to cause some
analogous harm. The price of the permit to the corporation would
approximate the cost to affected parties of enduring the harm. If
the permit is priced appropriately, an optimal allocation of costs
and benefits will result from the corporation's choice between
paying for the permit or reducing the harmful effects of the enterprise, whichever is cheaper. 67 Because regulators rather than afplaintiff's spine), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1979, at 1, col.3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16, 1979) (drug company manufacturing diethylstilbestrol (DES) held liable .because use by plaintiff's mother of
DES during pregnancy was proximate cause of plaintiff's vaginal cancer) (plaintiff
did not prove that drug her mother took had been manufactured by defendant, but
did establish that defendant had played leading role in manufacturing and
distributing it-thereby having substantial responsibility, jointly with other manufacturers of drug, for subsequent damages). See generally Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability,46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 972-75 (1978).
64. To be sure, insurance premiums cannot perfectly reflect marginal risk since

the transaction costs of achieving such a high correlation are prohibitive. McKean,
Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 3, 43-44 (1970).
65. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-94, 135-73
(1970). Imposing liability on the corporation assumes that shareholders and corporate
managers are better situated than consumers, workers, or neighboring residents to
choose between avoiding the harm or compensating the other parties for enduring it.
66. See sources note 26 supra.
67. See generally B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D.
HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 263-70.
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fected parties set the initial price of the permit, however, the actual, subjective harm may be misstated. Moreover, unlike liability
rules, permit systems would not directly compensate affected individuals since the permit would be purchased from the government.
On the other hand, marketable permits may be more efficient to
administer than liability rules since once purchased they could be
resold by the corporation without further governmental involvement.
To the extent that these market-perfecting strategies can overcome the above described problems, there is less need for a system of corporate governance or for traditional forms of business
regulation to render the corporation accountable. The diverse parties with a stake in corporate activity will efficiently allocate costs
and benefits among themselves through decentralized transactions.
Corporate managers who fail to satisfy shareholders will find that
share prices have declined and that their companies are prime targets for a takeover. 68 Consumers, workers, and neighboring residents can rely upon market exchanges, liability rules, and permits
to efficiently allocate costs and benefits between them and managers and shareholders. These market-perfecting strategies, however, have their own costs. Providing full disclosures, ensuring
market diversity, and overcoming hold-outs, free-riders, and negative externalities all may entail substantial sacrifice. It is therefore
appropriate to ask if there are circumstances under which other institutional frameworks outside market exchanges can do the job
more economically.
PARTICIPATION-PERFECTING STRATEGIES

An efficient allocation of corporate costs and benefits can also
be achieved (at least theoretically) through collective decisionmaking in which all affected parties reach agreement. While market exchanges are characterized by discrete trades between parties and
facilitated by decentralized price signals, collective decisionmaking
is marked by participation and signaled by votes. When parties become dissatisfied in market exchanges they take their business elsewhere; in collective decisionmaking, dissatisfied parties seek to
persuade others to vote their way.
68. Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967
DuKE L.J. 231, 236. See generally id. at 237-41; Manne, Our Two CorporationSystems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 265-68, 273-76 (1967).
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Because the costs of negotiating unanimous agreement among
all affected parties is likely to be prohibitive, however, collective
decisionmaking typically relies upon a majority vote among representatives of the affected parties. 69 Examples of such collective decisionmaking for the corporation abound. Shareholders are

accorded the right to select corporate directors 70 and vote upon
certain major issues of corporate reorganization. 71 Workers select

representatives for collective-bargaining units;72 and worker representatives and managers have a legal obligation to seek agreement
with one another "in good faith." 7 3 Creditors have limited rights to
participate in corporate decisionmaking when the corporation is re-

organized or liquidated under bankruptcy laws. 74 Moreover, all
parties can participate in corporate decisionmaking through the political process. That process generates governmentally enforced

standards barring unsafe or defective products, 75 setting corporate
tax rates, 76 defining the conditions under which corporations can
enter or leave a community, 7 7 and setting minimum requirements
78

for worker safety.
But collective decisionmaking will efficiently allocate the costs
and benefits of corporate activity only to the extent that certain
"participation imperfections" are overcome. Collective-decisionmaking processes require that (a) political organizing costs do not
disproportionately disadvantage diffuse interests that are spread'
69.

Less-than-unanimous

decisionmaking imposes obvious costs upon those

who disagree with the measure. But decisionmaking rules requiring unanimity or
near unanimity impose high costs of their own, since they necessitate lengthy bargaining and require strategies to overcome hold-outs. An optimal decisionmaking
rule would presumably minimize the likely sum of both costs. See generally J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 97-116 (1962).
70. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 703
(McKinney 1963).
71. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 251(c) (1974 & Supp. 1978).
72. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
73. Id. § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943); Cox, The Duty to Bargainin Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1401 (1958).
74. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§ 1102-1103, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be
codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102-1103).
75. See sources note 6 supra.
76. E.g., I.R.C. § 11 (corporate income tax); N.Y. TAX LAw § 209 (McKinney
1966 & Supp. 1979-1980) (corporate franchise tax).
77. E.g., S.1608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S10967 (daily ed. July
31, 1979) (National Employment Priorities Act of 1979).
78. See sources note 4 supra.
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widely and thinly among participants; (b) voters in the minority are
not "impacted" by the majority; (c) the correct balance is maintained between the cost of negotiating agreements and of avoiding
"corruption" of representatives; and (d) short-term concerns do not
overwhelm more beneficial long-term strategies.
Organizationof Diffuse Interests
Even unanimous agreement within a legislature, regulatory
agency, or corporate board room may not guarantee an improvement in overall welfare if the political strength of affected parties in
the decisionmaking process is not proportional to their numbers
and their potential aggregate stake in the outcome. A large and
amorphous group, each of whose members is only slightly affected
by a decision-such as citizens who may be exposed to toxic
wastes-will have difficulty organizing itself to influence the deci-

sion. While the large group's total stake may be high relative to
other parties, the cost of informing and summoning resources from
its far-flung and relatively disinterested members may be even
higher. In addition, organizing large groups is hampered by the
cost of overcoming free-riders. Conversely, a small group, each of
whose members has a high stake in a given decision-such as corporations who dump the toxic wastes-can organize itself with relative ease even though its total stake is lower than that of the larger
group. Thus the vigor and success with which parties are likely to
participate in legislative, regulatory, or corporate decisionmaking
may have little relation to the overall gains or losses at stake.
Participation-perfecting strategies seek to improve the match
between political strength and overall stake in the outcome by lowering the cost of organizing. One such strategy is to reduce the
amount of organizing that diffuse interests must undertake if they
are to participate effectively. For example, public funding of intervenors in regulatory agency proceedings when the intervenors
are representative of a larger class of diffused interests reduces the
amount of organization required. 7 9 Similarly, shareholder derivative suits8 0 and the award of attorney's fees in those actions 8l per79. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
80. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626 (McKinney 1963). Cf. Surowitz v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966) ("derivative suits have played a rather important role in protecting shareholders of corporations from the designing schemes and
wiles of insiders who are willing to betray their company's interests in order to
enrich themselves").
81. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(e) (McKinney 1963) (providing for payment
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mit one shareholder to accomplish what might otherwise require a
prohibitive amount of organization. 82 The amount of required organization is also reduced if participants are permitted to pool their
votes according to the strength of their preferences. For example,
influence if they can vote
diffuse shareholder interests gain added
83
cumulatively for corporate directors.
If large-scale organization remains a necessity, the decisionmaking process can be made more visible, thereby reducing the
costs of informing diffuse interests about what is at issue. 84 For example, diffuse interests can more easily organize themselves to participate in regulatory decisionmaking when agencies fully inform
the public about their proposed rules, 85 allow the press and the
public to observe their deliberations, 86 and maintain public records
of evidence accumulated in rulemaking proceedings. 8 7 Similarly,
diffuse interests can more effectively participate in the corporation
when management discloses its policies governing employment, 88
compensation, 89 investment,90 and environmental 9 ' policies. The
costs of organizing shareholders is also reduced 92by permitting access to corporate voting lists or proxy machinery.
Impacted Minorities
The very fact that collective decisionmaking dictates' the fate
of groups of individuals with similar interests implies that individof reasonable attorney's fees if action on behalf of corporation is successful or if

plaintiffs receive anything as result of settlement, judgment, or compromise).
82. For a discussion of shareholder derivative suits, see D. VOGEL, supra note
30, at 111-15.
83. See sources cited note 29 supra.
84. See Trubek, Public Advocacy: Administrative Government and the Representation of Diffuse Interests, in III ACCESS TO JUSTICE 447, 467-70, 476-81 (M.
Cappelletti & B. Garth eds. 1979).

85. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30A,

§§

2-3 (West 1979).

86. See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.
CODE ANN.

§

§ 552b (1976); IND.

5-14-1-4 (Burns 1974).

87. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 8(b), 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.0412 (West 1979).
88. For a discussion of Equal Employment Opportunity Disclosure Resolutions, see D. VOGEL, supra note 30, at 153-56.

89. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R.
90.

§ 229.20 (Item 4) (1979).

See, e.g., id. §§ 229.20 (Items 1-2), 240.14c-3.

91. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 33-6130, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16224, 44 Fed. Reg. 56,924 (1979) (amending 17 C.F.R.
(1979)).
92. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-7 to -8 (1979).
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ual preferences will not be uniquely satisfied to the extent possible
in market exchanges. Democratic majoritarian politics by definition
implies minorities who disapprove of the decision. If majority coalitions were constantly shifting, voters in the majority at one point in
time would know that they will need minority members for future
majority coalitions. Majority voters would also know that they will
be in the minority in some future decisions. Both groups, therefore, could be expected to engage in long-term bargaining, trading
off losses in one time period for gains in another. These trades
would, over time, compensate all voters for any losses they may incur and therefore approximate unanimity. Thus, viewed over the
long term, all participants would agree to the entire series of decisions, notwithstanding their disagreement with specific decisions
along the way.
Shifting majorities can be relied on to protect minority interests, however, only if voters in the majority cannot make decisions
that irrevocably alter the organization and place certain interests in
a permanent minority.9 3 The preferred shareholder who finds his
or her dividend arrearages eliminated in recapitalization, 9 4 the minority shareholder who finds that the corporation is being operated
by a dominant shareholder in a way that lessens his or her potential return, 95 shareholders who discover that a merger has diluted
their voting rights, 96 or even minority citizens who discover that
their voting district has been redesigned to dilute the strength of
their minority votes 97 are all "impacted" by majorities who do not
need their minority votes in the future. 98
93. The so-called voters' paradox or cyclical-majority problem suggests that
control over the order in which issues are presented for a vote can empower the
agenda setter to obtain the results he or she prefers. See generally K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 94-95 (2d ed. 1963); D. BLACK, THE
THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 39-51 (1958); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE
CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 38-40 (1970); Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory:
An Overview and Interpretation,20 AM. J. POLITICAL Sci. 511 (1976). Thus, unless
such control is assigned randomly, majorities who set the agenda can permanently
impact minority voters.
94. Compare Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (Sup. Ct.
1936), with Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup.
Ct. 1940).
95. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
96. Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 431 n.4, 143 A.2d 25, 28 n. 4 (1958);
see Marks v. Autocar Co., 153 F. Supp. 768, 771 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
97. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Comillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960). This form of legislative failure provides an important rationale for constitutional review. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).
98. The same result obtains if a majority of participants form a permanent alli-
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To avoid impacted minorities, decisions to irrevocably alter
the organization might require agreement by substantially more
than a majority. 99 Alternatively, particularized rules might govern
those votes that could seriously undermine a minority's positionsuch as a requirement in parent-subsidiary mergers that only common stock be used to pay off minority interests in the subsidiary
according to premerger stock-price ratios.I 00
Negotiation and Corruption
Because the costs of negotiating directly among all affected individuals about every issue is often prohibitive, collective-decisionmaking processes typically depend upon systems of representation in which individuals elect agents to whom they entrust most
decisions. But agents may be corrupted. They may heed their own
personal agendas-seeking money, privilege, or power for themselves-rather than represent the best interests of their constituents. 1 1 Even well-intended agents may become insensitive to constituent views because of the physical or social distance separating
them from their constituents.
Accordingly, there may exist a trade-off between the transaction costs of direct negotiations between participants and the "corruption" costs of representative systems. The greater the distance
between the agents and the affected parties, the higher the probability that the agents will be corrupted; but remoteness may also be
consistent with ease of negotiations and lower costs of reaching
agreement. Legislative and regulatory processes exemplify one
end of this scale. Parties elect representatives, who in turn appoint
administrators to head regulatory agencies, which in turn prescribe standards for corporate managers. Since the final decisions
are thereby delegated to relatively few agents, transaction costs of
ance to block minority initiatives. It has been reported, for example, that labor representatives on the boards of ,German corporations have formed alliances with management against large shareholders and shareholder representatives. Vagts, Reforming
the "Modern" Corporation:Perspectivesfrom the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23, 73

(1966).
99. A number of state statutes permit articles of incorporation to require a
greater proportion of votes for certain transactions. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 616
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1979-1980); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.52 (Page 1978).
For an example of such a provision, see Seventh Amended Articles of Incorporation
of Standard Oil Company (Ohio) 6 (Aug. 23, 1979).
100. See Chirelstein, Legislative Solutions for FiduciaryProblems, in FEDERAL
CHARTERING FOR LARGE CORPORATIoNs (W. Moore ed. 1980) (forthcoming).
101. See S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION 1-29 (1978).
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negotiating agreements are minimized. But since personal agenda
setting is possible at every level, corruption costs may be high. An
intermediate trade-off occurs to the extent that affected parties participate directly in the regulatory process through broadened

rights of standing,102 intervention, 1 03 and due process, 10 4 and

through public funding of intervenor groups that are representative
of larger interests.105 The highest transaction costs, but lowest corruption costs, occur when affected interests have a direct voice in
corporate management.10 6
Proposals to make a majority of corporate directors outsid-

ers10 7 can be viewed as an attempt to reduce the likelihood of
corruption in management, since outside directors presumably
have no personal financial interest that might compete with their
responsibility to represent the best interests of shareholders. Simi-

larly, the call for direct board representation for all parties potentially affected by corporate action' 01 8 -including workers, consumers, and neighboring citizens-can be seen as a means of
remedying corruption in regulatory agencies and legislatures,
which have responsibility for representing these nonshareholder interests in setting standards for corporate conduct. Thus to the extent that such corruption can be reduced within legislatures (for ex102. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669 (1973); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1723-47.
103. See Gellhorn, supra note 31, at 362-88; Stewart, supra note 13, at 1748-56.

104. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977). But see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
105. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
106. See generally sources note 30 supra and accompanying text.

107. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
108. See sources note 30 supra and accompanying text. With its announcement
on October 25, 1979, that management would nominate Douglas Fraser, president of
the United Auto Workers Union, as a director, the Chrysler Corporation became the
first major American corporation to agree to place a worker representative on its
board. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1979, at 1, col. 4. A demand from an organization of independent dealers seeking similar representation soon followed, and some Congressmen suggested a government representative as well. Chrysler May Face Rush of
Candidates For Seats on Board, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1979, at 6, col. 5. The Chrysler
initiative has roots in European theories of codetermination. The proposal for UAW
representation on the Chrysler board was first made in 1975 and was based on a similar proposal made by Chrysler's British subsidiary to labor unions in the United
Kingdom. Murphy, Workers on the Board: Borrowing a European Idea, 27 LAB. L.J.
751, 751-52 (1976). The British had borrowed the idea from longstanding practices in
Germany, which more recently have spread to the Low Countries and Scandinavia.
See Davies, supra note 30, at 257-61; Germany's Requiring of Workers on Boards
Causes Many Problems, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
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ample, through public financing of election campaigns 0 9) and
within regulatory agencies (for example, through restricting the
"revolving door" of employment from regulatory agency to regulated industry"°), there is perhaps less justification for constituent
representation on boards of directors. By the same token, a truly
effective system of constituent representation on corporate boards
may vitiate the need for legislative and regulatory oversight of the
corporation.
Dominance of Short-Term Concerns
Because voting coalitions are likely to be temporary, and because constituency representatives are likely to be in office for limited periods of time, collective decisionmaking may be dominated
by short-term, immediate concerns at the expense of long-term
policies. In politics, memories are often short and passions run
high. Exigencies of the moment may overwhelm more sensible, incremental solutions. Thus legislators, regulatory agency administrators, and corporate directors and managers may aim for short-term
results that immediately satisfy their constituencies and over which
temporary compromises can be negotiated, even though the solutions may not be as beneficial over the long term. Representatives
may have little to gain from long-term strategies whose payoffs may
be years or decades away. By then, different voting coalitions will
be seeking trades of different sorts and the representatives themselves may be in different jobs.
In contrast, the decentralized price system automatically applies a discount rate to the future."' Long-term expectations frame
every exchange. Prices adjust constantly and incrementally to every new item of information introduced anywhere in the system
that may bear upon the future. Indeed, there is fierce competition
109. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012 (1976) (federal funds for presidential candidates). There have been a number of proposals to provide similar funding for congressional campaigns. E.g., H.R. 3114, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H1532
(daily ed. Mar. 20, 1979); H.R. 2849, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H1327
(daily ed. Mar. 13, 1979); S. 623, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 52530 (daily
ed. Mar. 12, 1979).
110. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 501(a), 92
Stat. 1824 (to be codified in 18 U.S.C. § 207) (restricting former agency employees in
their representation of clients before their former agency).
111. In this respect collective decisionmaking has the same disadvantage as
community property. Cf. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350-59 (private property
internalizes costs of current activity on future value, community property externalizes these costs).
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for such data since earlier and better predictions can provide their
recipient with important bargaining advantages and large profits.
For these reasons, collective decisionmaking may cause resources to be squandered rather than saved and invested. Corporate managers bent on showing increases in earnings may choose
quick growth through merger or acquisition rather than a gradual
and more sensible long-term strategy of investment in new plant
and equipment. 112 Legislators may choose to reduce taxes, particularly in an election season, notwithstanding inflationary effects. And
regulatory administrators bent on showing quick results may set
deadlines for the implementation of certain corporate standards
that, because of technological lag, are far more expensive to put
into effect in the short term than they would be had the schedule
been more gradual and incremental.
The most common participation-perfecting strategy for remedying this predominance of short-term concerns is to insulate representatives from their constituents. Terms of offices may be extended so that representatives need not feel so keenly the
pressures to produce short-term results. 113 Regulatory agencies
may be given independent status so that neither Congress nor the
President can directly interfere in their decisionmaking. 114 Corporate managers may be insulated from shareholders by means of cor115
porate board members who have no managerial responsibility.
To be sure, these strategies for insulating representatives from
short-term pressures may be inconsistent with strategies designed
to avoid "corruption" and ensure accountability to constituents.
112. A growing body of literature and a number of studies suggest that management may be responding to short-term goals rather than long-term profit maximization. See, e.g., Bower, On the Amoral Organization, in THE CORPORATE SOCIETY
178, 191-92, 194-95, 198 (R. Marris ed. 1974).
113. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 186, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H438
(daily ed. Feb. 1, 1979) (proposing one six-year term for President and Vice President; limited number of consecutive three-year terms for Representatives); H.R.J.
Res. 168, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H339 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1979)
(proposing one six-year term for President and Vice President; limited number of
staggered four-year terms for Representatives).
114. There is a broad consensus, for example, that the Federal Reserve Board
should remain independent. This independent status is provided by 12 U.S.C. § 250
(1976). For a discussion of independent regulatory agencies, see Dixon, The Independent Commissions and Political Responsibility, 27 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1975).
115. See Andrews, The Roundtable Statement on Boards of Directors, HARv.
Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 24, 26-34; Blumberg, Reflections on Proposalsfor Corporate Reform Through Change in the Composition of the Board of Directors: "Special Interest" or "Public" Directors, 53 B.U. L. REV. 547, 548-59 (1973).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 5

This tension is perhaps inherent in all representative systems of
collective decisionmaking.
*

*

*

Participation-perfecting strategies for governing the corporation thus present a mirror image to market-perfecting strategies.
To the extent that these participation-perfecting strategies overcome the problems of diffused interests, impacted minorities, corruption, and the dominance of short-term concerns, there is less
need to improve market exchanges. The diverse parties who have a
stake in corporate activity can be expected to allocate the risks and
benefits among themselves in an efficient manner through collective decisionmaking. As with market perfecting, however, participation perfecting is costly. Improving the allocation of corporate risks
and benefits solely by means of collective decisionmaking would
entail great expense.
EQUITY
To be sure, unanimous agreement among affected parties
about corporate costs and benefits may nevertheless result in outcomes that we as a society deem unacceptable. Regardless of its efficiency, the resulting allocation may be inequitable. 1 16 Workers
who accept higher wages in return for undertaking more hazardous
assignments, neighboring citizens who purchase or rent real estate
at a low price or accept a lower tax rate in return for industrial
noise and pollution, and consumers who purchase products at a low
price in return for risks to life and health all can be said to have
agreed voluntarily to the resulting allocation of corporate costs and
benefits. But that allocation, even if efficient, is premised upon an
initial distribution of wealth to which they might not have agreed
had their agreement been solicited.'1 7 Their voluntary acceptance
of these corporate risks for the sake of the benefits that accompany
them is voluntary only in terms of the limited choice open to them
of accepting such risks or doing without the benefits. Both
116.

If income distribution is unfair, the fact of unanimous consent to a pro-

posed change will not cure the unfairness. Arguably, however, if all participants
could agree unanimously to principles for allocating costs and benefits, regardless of
each participant's own position in the prospective allocation, the resulting outcome
would be fair. See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-30 (1971). For a

discussion of "entitlements" that are to be protected by "inalienability rules," see
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092-93, 1111-15.

117. See, e.g., Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 3 (1975).
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alternatives may be offensive to widely held notions of equity and
therefore politically unacceptable. Under these circumstances, collective decisionmaking through governmental entities helps ensure
that the allocation of corporate risks and benefits is fair. 118
Even if the polity as a whole fails to redress perceived inequities in the allocation of corporate risks and benefits, morally concerned individuals may urge the corporation to undertake unilateral action to improve the lot of certain disadvantaged parties. The
call for "corporate social responsibility" often comes in this form.
Regardless of whether parties knowingly and voluntarily agree to a
given allocation, proponents of corporate social responsibility urge
that the allocation be changed: The corporation should provide
better working conditions, higher quality consumer products, and a
cleaner environment than affected parties would have accepted
within perfected market exchanges or perfected collective-decisionmaking processes. In addition, the corporation should undertake
"good deeds," such as investing in ghetto housing, developing
training programs for disadvantaged youths, and moving factories
into poorer communities.
Often left out of the debate about corporate social responsibility, however, is the fact that these unilateral initiatives are costly.
Who is to pay for them? If they are financed by the very parties
who are to reap the benefits, then the resulting allocation is not
more equitable. On the contrary, these parties arguably are worse
off than they were before the initiatives were undertaken since
their choices within market exchanges and collective-decisionmaking processes indicated a preference for doing without the added
benefits and added costs. Improvements in product quality financed by price increases, improvements in working conditions
made possible through reductions in workers' real earnings, or improvements in environmental quality resulting in reductions in the
corporation's level of economic activity within the region all represent "packages" of corporate costs and benefits that consumers,
workers, and neighboring citizens presumably do not wish to have.
Alternatively, the resulting allocation may merely transfer wealth
from some individuals to others within the same group without any
118. Increasingly agencies are being called on to accommodate the competing
claims of private interest groups. Stewart, supra note 13, at 1683-84, 1712. Professor
Posner argues that issues are delegated to administrative agencies to promote "the
operation of interest group politics rather than allocative efficiency." R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 480.
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coherent equitable principle to sustain or guide the decision, as in
the case of improved working conditions requiring lay-offs of certain workers.
If, however, the improvements come at the expense of parties
who are thought to be more advantaged, such as shareholders, the
corporation becomes a vehicle for redistributing wealth. Corporate
altruism of this sort is limited by the possibility that reduced earnings will cause the price of the corporation's shares to drop and
thereby make it profitable for others to wrest control from current
managers and eliminate the altruistic practice. 119 Some altruism is
still possible, however, since the cost of displacing management is
often quite high.120 The real problem with this alternative is that
there are no criteria for determining how much redistribution is
appropriate and what form it should take. Corporate managers
alone are ill suited to making these decisions. Indeed, it can well
be asked whether the corporation is a legitimate vehicle for such
redistributions. 121 Moreover, even if the corporation were justified
in redistributing wealth from its more advantaged to its less advantaged members, there are no obvious grounds for deciding who fits
within each camp. Shareholders, who include persons dependent
on pension funds and insurance companies, are not necessarily
wealthier than workers, consumers, or neighboring citizens.
To be sure, the call for corporate social responsibility sometimes sounds like a moral imperative, but it is frequently a strategic one. According to its proponents in this context, corporate social responsibility makes good business sense. Since market exchanges are imperfect and governmental regulation at best is an
unsubtle instrument for reconciling private or public interests, it is
argued that corporate managers should exercise responsible selfrestraint in their dealings with shareholders, consumers, workers,
and neighboring citizens.' 22
This form of corporate social responsibility is defined and
justified by virtue of what it accomplishes for the corporation in
119. For a discussion of the relationship between earnings and share price, see
Baumol, Performance of the Firm and Performance of its Stocks, in ECONOMIC
PoLIcY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 127 (H. Manne ed. 1969).
120. This is in part a function of protectionist state takeover statutes. E.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.212-.215 (Supp.
1979).
121. See Williamson, supra note 38, at 65-66.
122. According to Irving Shapiro, Chief Executive Officer of Du Pont, corporate chief executive officers must accept public responsibilities. "I view myself as
representing the public." Phil. Inquirer, Apr. 4, 1979, at 12, col. 1.
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the long run: Avoiding additional governmental regulation 123 and
achieving long-term profitability. 2 4 Additional regulation is the
threat; it will be imposed unless the corporation responds to the
various sources of public discontent that fuel it. Long-term
profitability is the reward; in the long run, business can prosper
only in an environment in which all of its constituents are (and feel
that they are) treated equitably. At base, this principle of social responsibility derives its meaning both from market exchanges (profits over the long term) and collective decisionmaking (a realistic
threat). Rather than being premised on an independent vision of
the corporation's proper ethical role in modern society, this principle takes its definition directly from that allocation of corporate
risks and benefits to which all affected parties would agree in market exchanges or collective-decisionmaking processes. Its underlying value, therefore, is efficiency, not equity. Since this view of
corporate social responsibility is defined by market-perfecting and
participation-perfecting strategies, it provides no further insight
into how corporate costs and benefits should be allocated.
TOWARD REFORM

Corporate reform and regulatory reform lie on a continuum
calling for improvements in both market exchanges and collectivedecisionmaking processes. Ultimately the machinery of corporate
governance, governmental regulation, and market exchanges can
be evaluated only as parts of a single integrated system for
allocating the costs and benefits of corporate enterprise.
In a theoretical world of perfect market exchanges and perfect
collective-decisionmaking processes it would make no difference
which was responsible for allocating the costs and benefits of corporate enterprise. Unanimous agreement through either system
would signal an improved allocation. But the world is not perfect,
and strategies designed to enhance the workings of market exchanges and collective decisionmaking are themselves costly.
Viewed in this light, the goal of the various proposals to make the
corporation more accountable and to reform the regulatory process
is to reduce the cost of approximating unanimous agreement among
affected parties about how corporate costs and benefits should be
123. Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-existence with Society, 60
GEO. L.J. 57, 70 (1971).
124. Novick, Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Socially Responsible Corporation,in
MANAGING THE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE CORPORATION 74, 77-78, 84-89 (M. Anshen
ed. 1974).
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allocated. In evaluating these proposals, therefore, the central issue
is what combination of them, under what circumstances, will minimize the cost of deriving such an allocation.
To some extent, market-perfecting and participation-perfecting
strategies complement one another. Working together, they reduce
the cost of deriving an efficient allocation to a greater extent than
would either system operating alone. For example, participationperfecting rules for proxy contests facilitate a market for management control. 125 Inferior management that causes share prices to
decline will often be replaced by superior management through a
takeover or proxy fight. 12 6 This replacement ensures a more efficient use of corporate assets than would be the case if market exchanges alone worked to reduce share prices without an opportunity to alter management, or if collective decisionmaking alone
provided an opportunity to alter management without a corresponding opportunity to sell shares. 127 A reasonable inquiry, therefore, would seek to discover whether participation-perfecting strategies designed for other parties affected by corporate activitynotably workers, consumers, and neighboring citizens-might similarly complement the market exchanges in which they currently
bargain, reducing the cost of accommodating their interests as well.
Market-perfecting and participation-perfecting strategies are
also occasionally at odds. For example, proposals to place representatives of all parties potentially affected by corporate activity on
boards of directors-including workers, suppliers, creditors, consumers, and neighboring citizens-may improve the efficiency of
collective decisionmaking. But these mechanisms may also reduce
the efficiency of market exchanges if the same parties are represented on the boards of formerly competitive firms; this will give
128
Simithem the ability to engage in some degree of coordination.
125. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POLITICAL
ECON. 110, 114-15 (1965).
126. Id. at 112-15.

127. See Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 399, 410-11 (1962); Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share
Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1430-34 (1964). Professor Manne also argues that

efficiency would be maximized if shareholders could sell their votes without selling
their shares. Id. at 1434-37.
128. It is possible that these actions may violate the antitrust laws. See 15
U.S.C. § 19 (1976) (no person may serve on boards of two or more competitors any
one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than one

million dollars). See generally Steuer, Employee Representation on the Board: Industrial Democracy or Interlocking Directorates?, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255,
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larly, proposals calling for a uniform federal incorporation statute to
replace existing state statutes 12 9 are consistent with participationperfecting strategies. Shareholders who seek to protect their interests through collective decisionmaking in the corporation otherwise
may find that the state statutes, in a "race for the bottom" to attract corporate headquarters, provide little real opportunity for
shareholder participation in the corporation. 130 Yet, federal incorporation may be inconsistent with market-perfecting strategies. It
would replace what is now a diverse "market" in corporate management structures with a single, uniform structure about which
potential shareholders have no choice. Diversity helps ensure that
such structures facilitate the highest shareholder returns; firms will
not incorporate (and shareholders will not purchase shares in firms
that incorporate) in states whose mandated structures inhibit profit
maximization. A uniform structure would provide no such assurance, since it would not indicate to what extent the structure inhibited profit maximization, nor would it offer a self-policing mechanism for remedying any such inhibiting effects.
A decision to undertake either market-perfecting or participation-perfecting strategies will depend upon the nature of the risks
and benefits at stake. As we have seen, market-perfecting strategies are likely to be especially costly where (1) the risks are difficult for parties to evaluate, even if information about them is provided; (2) scale economies are substantial, so that policies seeking
to maintain diversity in the market would require sacrificing significant benefits; (3) the risks or benefits are likely to be so widespread
that bargaining over them by affected parties is unworkable; or (4)
risks or benefits are so high that market-perfecting strategies create
inequities. In these circumstances, participation-perfecting strategies may offer superior means of accommodation. On the other
hand, participation-perfecting strategies are likely to be particularly
costly where (1) either risks or benefits-but not both-are spread
so widely and thinly over the population that it is difficult to organ276-96 (1977) (while individual union official's membership on more than one board
of directors of competing corporations would violate antitrust laws, membership by
different officials of same union with no member holding more than one seat would
not be violation).
129. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 8; Schwartz, supra
note 123, at 98-103; cf. Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700-05 (1974) (proposal to create Federal Corporate Uniformity Act).
130. See Cary, supra note 129, at 669-86. Professor Winter has sought to address these criticisms directly. B. WiNTER, supra note 48, at 7-11, 22-23.
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ize diffused interests to participate; (2) it is difficult to guard against
irrevocable changes in voting rules by the majority; (3) direct negotiation among affected parties is apt to be long and arduous; (4) it is
difficult to guard against corruption of representatives; or (5) constituents' short-term concerns require that decisionmakers be insulated from them, but such insulation substantially increases the
possibility of corruption. Under these circumstances market-perfecting strategies may offer superior means of accommodation.
Which institutional framework can most cheaply achieve an efficient and equitable allocation of the costs and benefits of corporate behavior? The answer varies depending upon the nature of the
costs and benefits at issue. Improving market exchanges will sometimes be the best solution; but occasionally such improvements will
be too costly and collective decisionmaking will offer a more efficient or equitable means of accommodating all affected parties.
Typically, the preferred framework will be a mixture of improved
market exchanges and collective-decisionmaking processes.
This analysis can be illustrated by any one of a number of issues currently discussed under the rubric of corporate accountability or regulatory reform. For example, worker safety could be determined by either of two processes based generally upon markets:
workmen's compensation laws, which establish a no-fault liability
system by which firms insure their workers against work-related injuries, or collective bargaining between workers and employees, in
which working conditions are at issue. Worker safety could also be
determined by any of three processes based generally upon collective decisionmaking: Rulemaking by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, establishing standards for workplace safety;
decisions by corporate boards of directors upon which worker representatives sit; or employee stock-ownership plans, by which employees receive voting shares in the corporation and therefore gain
an opportunity to vote directly for improved workplace safety. In
which of these processes should we place greatest reliance for fairly
and efficiently determining an appropriate level of worker safety?
Which process is most susceptible to strategies for perfecting markets or improving participation?
A workmen's compensation system based upon insurance for
work-related injuries theoretically could motivate employers and
workers to invest in just the right amount of precaution against
workplace hazards. To be efficient and fair, however, such a system
would have to overcome substantial obstacles. First, the employing
firm must be under some pressure from competitors to keep its
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prices low, lest the firm be able to choose-out of sheer indifference-to pay higher insurance payments rather than to bear
the lower costs of preventing accidents. By the same token, insurance companies must be competitive with one another lest they too
be able to set premiums without regard to relative safety. Yet, if
there are substantial economies of scale in either the employing
firr or insurance markets, such competition may come at too high
a price. Second, the recipient of the compensation award may feel
that it is either inadequate or overly generous, so that it does not
match the subjective injury he or she sustained. Finally, an insurance system may permit workers to be exposed to certain risks that
we as a society simply find abhorrent, notwithstanding that workers
freely chose to bear them with compensation.
Collective bargaining also has substantial disadvantages that
would be costly to overcome. Workers not organized into unions
would face enormous transaction costs in attempting to bargain for
improved safety. Even organized workers may find it difficult to
credibly threaten withdrawal from future dealings if they have
no other employment opportunities within the geographic area.
Finally, it may be difficult for workers who wish to bargain for
safer working conditions to obtain accurate information about the
potential dangers at a particular workplace: Some hazards, such as
those affecting internal organs, do not become evident for years
after exposure; others affect so few workers at any one time that
they are difficult to recognize.
Regulatory processes that establish certain minimum standards
of workplace safety also have substantial disadvantages. A uniform
standard governing diverse workplaces is likely to be either too
strict and expensive relative to the safety it achieves in certain
work environments, or too lax relative to the safety a stricter
standard could achieve in other environments. Because of the
enormous variety of potentially serious workplace hazards, however, the costs of deciding upon specific appropriate safety standards for any but a fraction of them is apt to be extraordinarily
high. The regulatory agency will find it difficult to obtain enough
accurate data to both design appropriate standards and discover
failures to comply with them. Finally, regulatory agency personnel
may become insensitive to various concerns of workers or employers because agency personnel are physically and psychologically remote from the workplace, or because they are politically dependent upon either workers or employers, but not upon both.
Worker representatives on boards of directors cannot be relied
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upon to establish appropriate levels of workplace safety. Worker
representatives may simply be outvoted by a majority of the
board, which can manipulate the agenda to effectively negate their
participation. Alternatively, worker representatives may be more
concerned with obtaining highly visible, short-term results-such
as higher wages-which will show that the representatives are acting in the workers' behalf, than with less dramatic and long-term
benefits associated with improved safety. Finally, worker representatives may become acculturated into the managerial elite, and
thereby grow less concerned about representing the interests of
workers.
Employee stock ownership also poses substantial problems.
Employees' financial interest in the corporation may be disproportionately small relative to their interest in workplace safety. Moreover, the costs of negotiating and reaching agreement among a majority of shareholders about specific standards for workplace safety
are apt to be very high. These transactions costs will be even
higher if the safety issues are technical, involving complex data
about costs and benefits.
Given these obstacles to perfecting any single process for deciding on worker safety, an appropriate strategy would be to assign
certain responsibilities to each process according to its comparative
advantage over the others. Workmen's compensation schemes, for
example, might be relied upon to guarantee adequate compensation to injured workers rather than to motivate firms to invest in an
appropriate level of safety, particularly where more perfect competition would be costly to achieve. Collective bargaining might be
relied upon to deal with workplace hazards unique to particular
firms or industries, rather than to deal with more typical hazards.
Regulatory agencies, on the other hand, might be responsible for
establishing broad standards for hazards that are likely to arise in a
wide variety of workplaces, rather than for attempting to set detailed requirements for a large number of specific, potential hazards. In addition, regulatory agencies could prevent workers from
undertaking certain risks that society finds abhorent, despite the
willingness of workers to bear the risk at a freely agreed upon rate
of compensation. Worker representatives on boards of directors
could help ensure that management develops adequate means for
discovering potential workplace hazards and informing workers and
regulatory agencies about them in a timely manner. Employee
shareholders could seek to have management devote a certain min-
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imum percentage of yearly profits toward improving worker health

and safety.
None of these responsibilities is beyond the relative competence of the particular market exchange or collective-decisionmaking process to which it is assigned. Given the existence of the
above-mentioned market imperfections and impediments to participation, however, no single process is best equipped to handle the
entire job. Together, the mix of processes and responsibilities
could help to ensure a fair and efficient allocation to workers of
corporate risks and benefits-without requiring that substantial investments be made in perfecting any one process.

The evaluation of various market-perfecting strategies and proposals to improve collective decisionmaking-running the gamut
from new modes of corporate governance to regulatory reformcannot be undertaken in an analytic vacuum. Each proposal may
have a part to play in better accommodating the interests of parties
affected by corporate activity; they are inextricably related to one
another, and the correct mix is largely dependent upon the risks
and benefits at issue. They should be viewed as an integrated system of accountability, not as separate panaceas for all that ails the
corporation.
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